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Sheldon: Nuclear Waste: The Problem Remains Unburied

NUCLEAR WASTE: THE PROBLEM
REMAINS UNBURIED*
KARIN P. SHELDON**

I. Introduction
Since the late 1950s, the Department of Energy (DOE) and
its predecessor agencies have proposed to dispose of radioactive
wastes by burying them underground.1 After twenty years of
research and development, however, DOE is unable to demonstrate that a geologic repository will protect the public from the
hazards of radioactive nuclear waste. Two fundamental
problems have plagued the effort. First, "federal officials ...
[have] failed to understand that they are dealing with problems
that [are] not solely or even primarily technical in nature."'2 Second, the technologists have seriously underestimated the complexity and difficulty of the task of keeping wastes out of the
biosphere.3 Failure to confront adequately these issues has resulted in a history of delays, missteps, and radical changes of
direction for the waste disposal program. This program's history
is instructive because it illustrates how little the federal government has learned in its years of involvement with the waste disposal problem. The same issues confront DOE today as in the
* This Article was adapted from a Position Statement and Cross-Statement file by
the Natural Resources Defense Council, in the Waste Confidence Rulemaking
Proceedings of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. For a full discussion of the origin,
nature and purposes of the proceeding, see Brown & Bergholz, Nuclear Waste-The
Case for Confidence in Disposal, 32 S.C.L. REV. 851, 851-56 (1981).
** Staff Attorney, Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, Inc.; A.B., Vassar College, 1967;
J.D., University of Washington, 1970. The author wishes to thank Dr. Thomas Cochran,
Dr. Terry A. Lash, Dr. Arthur Tamplin, and Ms. Georgia Yuan, all of the Natural Resources Defense Council, and her law clerk, James Martin, for their assistance in the
preparation of this Article.
1. COMMITTEE ON WASTE DISPOSAL OF THE DIVISION OF EARTH SCIENCES, NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, THE DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE ON LAND, (NAS-NRS Pub.

519, 1957).
2. R.G.

HEWLErT, FEDERAL POLICY FOR THE DISPOSAL OF HIGHLY RADIOACTIVE WATES
FROM COMMERCIAL NucLEAR PowER PLANTS, AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS, 3 (DOE, Mar. 9,

1978). Mr. Hewlett is the Chief Historian for the Department of Energy.
3. See note 6 infra.
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1950s, and the same criticisms can be made of its present waste
disposal program as have been made of its efforts during the last
two decades.
After passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Atomic.
Energy Commission (AEC) 4 and its advisers chose bedded-salt
deposits as the most likely geological formation for the effective
disposal of commercially produced, high-level wastes. In the
early 1960s, the AEC altered its plans for federally regulated geologic waste disposal. It proposed instead to delegate responsibility for formulating a program for the indefinite storage of
reprocessed, high-level liquid wastes in near-surface tanks initially to the nuclear industry and eventually to state governments. The plan called for repeated transfer of these wastes to
5
new tanks as the old storage tanks wore out.

Unfortunately, the perpetual, tank-storage plan was based
upon inadequate study. For example, liquid wastes were placed
in storage tanks at a facility near West Valley, New York, although methods had not been determined for removal of the
wastes from the tanks when it came time to transfer them. Even
today, no satisfactory removal method has been developed for
the wastes in the tanks at West Valley, and additional special
research is required. 6 The cost of solving the West Valley problem may be in excess of five hundred million dollars-more than
fifteen times the original cost of the waste storage facility and
more than one hundred times the amount of money set aside to
7
deal with the wastes.
In the late 1960s, after its disastrous experience with tank
storage of liquid wastes, the government renewed its effort to
4. In 1974, pursuant to § 104 of the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA), 42 U.S.C. §
814 (1974), the AEC was abolished and its functions split between the Energy Research
and Development Administration (ERDA) and the NRC, id. §§ 5811, 5841. The ERDA
was given responsibility for reaearch and development programs related to nuclear activities. Id. § 5813 (1974). The NRC was given licensing responsibility for nuclear activities,
including licensing of nuclear reactors, id. § 5841, and waste disposal facilities, id. § 5842.
Pursuant to § 202 of the Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7151
(1977), ERDA's nuclear waste management development and research functions were
transferred to the Department of Energy.
5. DIVISION OF WASTE MANAGEMENT AND TRANSPORTATION, ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, FEDERAL REPOSITORY PROGRESS REPORT 2 (June, 1972).
6. See generally U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STATUS OF EFFORTS TO CLEAN Up
THE SHUT-DOWN WESTERN N.Y. NUCLEAR SERVICE CENTER (EMD-8--69, June 6, 1980).

7. Id. at 16.
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develop a geologic repository. An abandoned salt mine near Lyons, Kansas, was selected as the ideal location for a pilot facility.8 Investigations following the initial testing of the mine disclosed, however, that water from adjacent mining operations
might seep into the repository and dissolve the salt. Concern
also developed over the potential intrusion of water into the
mine from surrounding abandoned wells. Residents of Kansas
increasingly became opposed to the project, and in early 1972 it
was halted, in part because of this strong public sentiment. The
Chief Historian of DOE, in his review of federal waste management policy through 1977, has said of this experience: "[T]he

AEC learned a classic lesson in American politics: a federal
agency disregards at its peril the potential power of state and
local officials whose opinions reflect the consensus of their constituency on matters of health and safety."'
In May 1972, the AEC announced its plan to build a "retrievable surface storage facility," or "RSSF," to store wastes
near the surface of the earth for an indeterminate period of
time, while the prolonged search for an acceptable, safe geological site continued. 10 This stopgap approach to a waste disposal
solution was judged to be unacceptable by many of the agencies
and organizations concerned with the problem.1" In 1975, the
Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA)
withdrew its request for funding of the RSSF; however, the
RSSF was retained purportedly as a back-up system in case
12
other repository plans failed.
In 1976, ERDA once again attempted to locate and construct a geologic repository. A potential site was found in northern Michigan. In June 1977, however, the federal government
abandoned the effort after residents of the area voted overwhelmingly to prohibit the siting of a waste repository within

8.See McClain, Status of AEC Project to Establisha Salt Mine Radioactive Waste
Repository, in 4TH INT'L SYMP. ON SALT, N. OHIO GEOLOGICAL SURVEY (1974).
9. R.G. HEWLETr, supra note 2, at 18.
10. See ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, MANAGEMENT OF COMMERCIAL HIGH LEVEL AND
TRANSURANIC CONTAMINATED WASTE (Envt'l Impact Statement, WASH-1539 (Sept.,
1974).
11. T. ENGLISH, AN ANALYSIS OF THE BACK END OF THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE WITH
EMPHASIS ON HIGH-LEVEL MANAGEMENT (Jet Propulsion Laboratory Pub. No. 77-59, Aug.
12, 1977).
12. Id.
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their state.'"
The Chief Historian of DOE has made an observation that
explains much of the AEC's repeated difficulty in deciding upon
a system and siting for a waste disposal facility:
[T]he [Atomic Energy] Commission did nothing to broaden
staff capabilities beyond those of the scientists, engineers, and
administrators who had been directing various aspects of the
waste disposal program since 1947. No effort was made to
study economic, political, and social factors that would well determine whether a specific waste disposal system could be installed at a given site. In this sense, the Commission learned
little from fifteen years of frustration and disappointment in
attempting to establish an acceptable waste disposal system.""
Since 1977, the debate within the scientific community concerning the ultimate feasibility of safe waste disposal has intensified greatly, and the federal agencies charged with responsibility for the development of a waste disposal system have issued a
number of studies that highlight the continuing uncertainties. 15
In March 1979, a federal interagency review group prepared a
comprehensive report for submission to the President. The report reviewed the nuclear waste disposal program and recommended changes. The Report to the President by the Interagency Review Group on Nuclear Waste Management'6 stated:
"[T]he management of radioactive wastes for the past three decades can be characterized by inadequate integration of waste
management R & D [research and development] efforts ...
caused in part by inadequate perceptions of the additional technological and scientific capabilities needed to develop an accept13. See Abbots, Radioactive Waste: A Technical Solution?, 35 BULL. ATOM. Scientists 12, 12-18 (Oct. 1979).
14. R.G. HEWLETT, supra note 2, at 29.
15. See, e.g., T. ENGLISH, AN ANALYSIS OF THE BACK END OF THE NucLR FUEL CYCLE WITH EMPHASIS ON HIGH-LEVEL MANAGEMENT (Jet Propulsion Laboratory Pub. No.
77-59, viii, Aug. 12, 1977); J. BREDEHOEFT, A. ENGLAND, D. STEWART, N. TRASK, & I.
WINOGRAD, GEOLOGIC DISPOSAL OF HIGH-LEvEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE-EARTH-SCIENCE
PERSPECTIVES, 3 (Geological Survey Circular 779, 1978); Ad Hoc Panel of Earth Scien-

tists, The State of Geological Knowledge Regarding PotentialTransport of High-Level
Radioactive Waste from Deep ContinentalRepositories,32 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

AGENCY, (June, 1978) [hereinafter cited

as State of Geological Knowledge].

16. INTERAGENCY REVIEW GROUP OR NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (NTIS Report, TID-29442, Mar., 1979) [hereinafter
cited as NTIS Report].
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able disposal program. ' 17
The federal government has renewed its search for a geological formation that can serve as a permanent waste repository.
In addition to the unresolved technical problems, serious political and social resistance to the siting of a disposal facility continues to mount throughout the country. Against the backdrop
of past mistakes, abandoned programs, and growing political opposition, there is substantial doubt concerning the federal government's ability to implement a safe method of the permanent
disposal of radioactive wastes.
Confidence in DOE's program must be judged in light of its
past efforts, for they are a measure of the agency's commitment
to the task, as well as its organizational ability and its perception of the obstacles to implementation. The Department has
made little real progress towards its goal of developing a safe,
readily implemented waste disposal method. The issues facing
the agency today are
strikingly similar to those which the federal government ha[s]
faced in managing nuclear wastes since 1955. The enduring nature of these wastes suggest[s] that solutions [will] not be
found in short-term responses to technical problems or adjustments to political pressures. Rather, ultimate solutions seem
likely to lie in a wise and penetrating analysis of the amalgam
of economic, political, cultural and technical factors. 18
As the former Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality observed:
[W]e have inherited a badly flawed federal program that provides a poor basis for getting to the right answer quickly and
no basis at all for public confidence. The history of waste
management in the U.S. provides ample warning of the risks of
having policy formulation colored by past programs and nuclear promotional concerns. It is a history of unbroken failure
to produce an acceptable method of waste disposal."'
This Article will focus primarily on DOE's failure to iden-

17. Id.
18. R.G. HEwLErrE, supra note 2, at 1.
19. Address by G. Speth, Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality, Mandate for the Future:Nuclear Wastes and the Public Trust, at 7, American Association
for the Advancement of Science, Houston, Tex. (Jan. 5, 1979) (emphasis added).
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tify and evaluate the social, political, and economic issues concerned in the implementation of a safe, reliable, and publicly acceptable waste disposal program. Initially, however, two other
major deficiencies in the DOE effort to solve the waste disposal
problem will be reviewed briefly.

The first of these deficiencies is DOE's failure to design a
program that will meet the licensing requirements of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Unless Congress enacts
legislation exempting waste disposal facilities from the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, the NRC will be responsible for
licensing waste repositories. 20 Licensing requires a determination
by the NRC that the site chosen for the facility is suitable and
that the facility can and will be constructed and operated at the
site without endangering the health and safety of the public.2 1
Such a determination must be based on evidence of the particular disposal activities to be licensed and their predicted environmental impacts as found on the record in the licensing proceedings. 2 Such a determination must also reflect findings by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission that the DOE waste disposal
plan, including the site chosen for the location of the repository,
meets NRC criteria for standards of performance. As presently
constituted, the DOE plan does not fulfill even NRC's draft siting criteria and performance requirements.23 DOE's approach to
siting and performance' 4 is dramatically different from that of
the NRC and may result in a conflict which would bring the
waste disposal program to a standstill.
Second, DOE continues to underestimate seriously the technological uncertainties and complexities inherent in the development of a disposal method that will isolate successfully radioactive wastes from the biosphere for thousands of years. In part,
this underestimation is due to its failure to design and carry out
a coordinated and comprehensive research effort. As the history
of federal involvement in waste disposal illustrates, at no time
20. Recently promulgated final regulations make clear that waste repository licensing will continue to be the responsibility of the NRC. See 46 Fed. Reg. 13,971 (1981).
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011, 2133(d) (1954); 10 C.F.R. §§ 50.57(a)(6) (1975), 50.91 (1974).
22. E.g., Pub. Serv. Co. (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), 6 N.R.C. 33, 41 (1977).
23. For a full discussion of DOE's approach to siting and performance of waste repositories, see Brown & Bergholz, Nuclear Waste-The Case for Confidence in Disposal,
32 S.C.L. R.v. 851, 879-87 (1981).
24. See note 26 and accompanying text infra.
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has the problem been defined in an objective and rational way.
Geologic media and waste forms have been chosen before adequate study of the characteristics required for successful performance of a repository has been completed. In situ testing to
determine how various host media will respond to repository
construction and operation has not been carried out. Basic technologies, such as those required for successful borehole and shaft
sealing, have not been developed. Even the various parts of the
effort are disconnected and diffuse. The agencies that share responsibility for the program lack direction and focus.2 5 The result is an effort that is unlikely to succeed in developing and
implementing a safe, reliable and publicly acceptable waste disposal program, at least for the foreseeable future.
II.

THE DOE HAS NOT DEVELOPED A WASTE DISPOSAL PLAN
THAT MEETS EVEN DRAFT

NRC SITING CRITERIA AND

PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS

A.

Siting Criteria

A major barrier to the release of radioactivity from a geologic waste repository is the geologic environment itself. The selection of a site for the location of a repository is, therefore, a
critical decision to be made in the early stages of repository development. The effectiveness of all engineered barriers to radiation release will rely, at least in part, on the geologic environment chosen. For this reason, the NRC has begun to develop
siting criteria which prohibit the location of repositories in areas
with geologic features that could threaten their safe operation.
These features include active faults, geothermal anomalies, acquifiers of potable water that could be disrupted or contacted by
the repository, known or potential mineral resources attractive
to humans, and fractures that provide pathways for fluid movement. As stated in the NRC draft technical criteria:
Unfavorable site characteristics are identified to eliminate from
consideration sites which would not be acceptable under any
circumstances for a HLW geologic repository or which would
present insuperable difficulties in terms of understanding the

25. These assertions are the opinions of Drs. Thomas Cochran, Terry A. Lash, Arthur Tamplin, and Ms. Georgia Yuan, technical experts at the Natural Resources Defense Council.
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geology and hydrology of the site or would introduce or compound uncertainties which would affect negatively confidence
in any licensing decision.26
The DOE's site selection process is in conflict with the NRC
approach. The DOE has not incorporated an identification of
unfavorable geologic characteristics into its site selection process. It has developed instead a set of siting criteria that are so
general and vague that virtually any area could be found satisfactory for further investigation. Rather than specify features
that would make a site unacceptable, the DOE calls for an assessment of the risk created by the existence of these features at
the site. No site will be rejected unless the risk to the repository
is judged to be "unacceptable." How an "unacceptable risk" will
be defined and what degree of engineering and expense will be
tolerated in reducing the risk inherent in a site have not been
determined by the DOE. The public as a whole has a great stake
in these two judgments and thus far has had virtually no input
into the decisionmaking process.
With respect to the NRC, however, the DOE's approach to
siting is likely to result in an unacceptable and, therefore, unlicensable site. Unless the two agencies coordinate their development of siting principles, the DOE is doomed to failure at the
initial stage of repository implementation.
B.

Performance Criteria

The NRC has promulgated provisional, technical performance requirements for waste repositories, including:
Assured retrievability of the waste for 50 years after
emplacement;
Containment by the waste package of all radionuclides for the
first 1,000 years;
For the period beyond 1,000 years, a limit on releases of one
part in 1,000 of the activity present in the waste per year;
Radionuclide travel times to the accessible environment must
be at least 1,000 years;
The block of host rock must extend beyond the repository for 2
26.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, DRAFT TECHNICAL CRITERIA FOR REGULATING

GEOLOGIC DIsPosAL OF HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WAsTE 5 (Enclosure "A" from Consent

Calendar item for the Commissioners from Robert B. Minogue, April 4, 1980), 45 Fed.
Reg. 31,393 (1980), [hereinafter cited as DRAFT TECHNICAL CRITERIA].

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol32/iss4/8

8

PROBLEM
19811 Sheldon: Nuclear
REMAINS
Waste: The
ProblemUNBURIED
Remains Unburied

919

km horizontally and 1 km vertically;
Areas potentially attractive to human intrusion must be
avoided;

The various seals must provide barriers that are as effective as
27
the undisturbed rock.

The DOE program plan does not satisfy these NRC requirements. It is geared instead to vague and flexible "objectives."
For example, the NRC's draft performance standards require
the waste package to provide containment of all radionuclides
for the first one thousand years after decommissioning of the geologic repository. 8 The DOE objectives, on the other hand, call
only for containment to be "virtually complete during the period
when radiation and thermal output are dominated by fission
product decay," and further state that this containment will be
done only "to the extent reasonably achievable." 29 The DOE
also suggests that exposures of ten or more millirem per year
would be permissible: "Radiological consequences should be
maintained within the level of variations in natural background
radiation associated with geographic location and domestic activities."30 Finally, DOE imposes an economic standard to govern the operation of a repository: "[T]he environmental impacts
associated with waste disposal systems should be mitigated to
the extent reasonably achievable. To the extent reasonably
achievable means that which is shown to be reasonable considering the costs and benefits associated with potential mitigative
1
m easures . . .. ,,a

With respect to the problem of human intrusion into a repository, the NRC draft technical criteria require the establishment of siting principles that will minimize the potential for
such an occurrence. Since the most likely activities resulting in
repository intrusion will concern exploration for natural resources and investigations of geophysical anomalies, the NRC
criteria prohibit the location of a repository in an area with at-

27. Id.
28. Id.
29. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, STATEMENT OF POSrTION, IN RE PRoPosED RULEMAKING
ON THE STORAGE AND DISPoSAL OF NUCLEAR WASTE, HI-6, NE-0007 (Apr. 15, 1980) [hereinafter cited as DOE STATEMENT OF POSmON].
30. Id.

31. Id. at 11-16.
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tractive natural features. 2
The DOE has ignored the NRC's recommendations for siting criteria that would avoid the use of sites with valuable natural resources. The DOE continues to consider salt to be an acceptable repository host,33 despite the fact that bedded salt and
salt domes are far more attractive resources than granite, shale,
or basalt. A special ad hoc panel of earth scientists commented
on this consideration in its report to the Environmental Protection Agency, calling the resource value of salt "an important
negative socio-economic factor" in the use of certain potential
repository sites.34 The report also stated that
[t]he most likely targets for near-term exploitation ...

are salt

domes because of the potential productivity of petroleum, halite, and sulfur; and bedded salt deposits because of their potash, halite, and gypsum. The United States has only 4% of the
world's total proven potash reserves, and most of these are
concentrated in the New Mexico area now being evaluated as
an HLW repository. Future conflicts between the demand for
HLW repositories in bedded salt and the needs of agriculture
for potash seem inevitable, and may even now constitute an
important negative socio-economic factor in the development
of some repositories. 5
The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site in New Mexico
is another example of DOE's disregard for formulating siting
principles that would reduce the repository hazards for future
generations. The site includes known accumulations of potash,
natural gas, and oil, all of which are valuable now and are likely
to become increasingly important in the future.
Two conclusions follow from the previous discussion. The
first is that the two federal agencies with the greatest responsibility for waste disposal do not share a view of how to achieve a

safe, reliable waste disposal program. This lack of coordination
is likely to create severe conflicts at the federal level and further
diminish the confidence of states and the public in the federal
government's ability to provide a timely solution. The second
DRAFT TECHNICAL CRITERIA, supra note 26, at 5.
33. See DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, MANAGEMENT OF COMMERCIALLY
ACTIVE WASTE (Final EIS, DOE/EIS-0046F, Oct., 1980).
34. STATE OF GEOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 15, at 40.
35. Id.

32.
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conclusion is that DOE is still proceeding in a haphazard and
piecemeal fashion. The NRC's draft performance requirements
are good benchmarks for the basic tasks to be accomplished in
solving the waste disposal problem. That DOE has not met any
of the requirements is a clear indication that its plan lacks definition and focus.
Ill. THE DOE HAS NOT DEFINED AND CARRIED OUT BASIC
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TASKS NECESSARY TO THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF A SAFE, RELIABLE WASTE

DISPOSAL

PROGRAM

The DOE's waste disposal plan has not been designed to
produce a comprehensive research effort. The program lacks coordination and specificity. Basic research tasks have not been
defined and carried out in a systematic manner. Consequently,
virtually every aspect of waste disposal research is plagued with
technological problems.
The DOE has not yet identified a waste form that will remain inert during the thousands of years that nuclear wastes
will remain hazardous to health. It has not identified which, if
any, host rock is acceptable. Although the program historically
has been directed almost exclusively to the use of salt as a repository host medium, the geochemical and mechanical response of
salt to heat and water create severe problems for its use as a
repository.3 6 Unfortunately, however, the research and development program formulated for salt structures is unsuited for the
investigation of other host rock structures, and no in situ testing
has been conducted on any of the other candidate host rocks. In
situ testing and the development of demonstration models essential for assessing the merits of geologic disposal lag behind
other, less important research efforts. Site work has been restricted primarily to federal reservations in order to avoid public
conflict.
Overall, the DOE has underestimated the technical difficulties inherent in the waste disposal problem. As a result, it has
not completed even basic tasks in the design and implementa36. See U.S. INTERAGENCY REvmw GROUP ON NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT, SUBGROUP REPORT ON ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGY STRATEGIES FOR THE ISOLATION OF NUCLEAR

WAsTE, App. A, at 61 (TID-28818 (Draft), Oct., 1978) [hereinafter cited as INTERAGENCY

REvIEw GROUP].
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tion of its program.
A.

The DOE Has Not Identified a Suitable Waste Form

The form chosen for ultimate disposal of radioactive wastes
will provide the most important barrier to the release of radioactivity from a repository. Only a waste form that remains inert
and stable for thousands of years under a variety of conditions
will prevent escape of radionuclides to the biosphere. Although
the selection of such a waste form has been the goal of past DOE
efforts, none has been found.
The choice of a waste form must reflect an understanding of
its potential interaction with the geologic repository. The waste
form should be selected for its stability in specific environments.
Unfortunately, glass continues to be DOE's "reference waste
form," despite test results which cast doubt on its chemical
37
stability.
Although DOE states that it intends to compare glass with
other waste forms before it decides which form to use, there is
very little data with which to make the comparison." In its
haste to choose a form, DOE appears to be opting for the technology that is most easily implemented today, regardless of
whether it represents an acceptable choice for future waste
containment.
B. The DOE Has Not Identified An Acceptable Host Rock
The DOE program historically has been directed almost exclusively towards the use of salt as a repository host medium.
This early consideration of salt as a repository host was largely
based on its high thermal conductivity, availability in areas of
low seismicity, tendency to "self-heal" fractures, and dryness.
Although these properties do make salt attractive for waste disposal, research has now uncovered significant problems with its
37. F. Conath, Relation of Solids to Nuclear Waste Isolation, in PROCEEDINGS O
FORMs 27 (Denver, Colo., Dec. 19-21, 1978); (Nuclear

THE CONFERENCE ON SOLID WASTE

Regulatory Commission NUREG/CP-0005). See also McCarth, Interactions Between
Nuclear Waste and SurroundingRock, 273 NATURE
. 216-17 (1978).
38. A recent National Academy of Sciences panel stated that "for wastes of high
specific activity and thermal power density, research and development of waste forms

other than glass should receive greater emphasis." NATIONAL AcADmMY OF SCIENCES, SoLIDIFICATION OF HIGH-LEVEL RADiOACTIVE WASTSS 63 (pre-publication copy) (Sept. 1978).
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geochemical and mechanical response to heat and to water.3 9
These problems are sufficiently severe to eliminate salt as a potential candidate medium.
Furthermore, salt is, and will continue to be, a valuable resource. It is often associated with other valuable resources such
as oil, gas, and potash. Salt mining and exploration for other resources in and near salt deposits has occurred in the past and
will continue to occur in the future. Thus, salt can be eliminated
from consideration as a host medium in accordance with NRC
criteria designed to avoid the siting of repositories in areas
where human activities could adversely affect the stability of the
site, increase the migration of radionuclides from the repository,
or provide pathways to the environment.
Salt is plastic and highly corrosive. Consequently, it also appears to be unacceptable as a host medium because it does not
meet the technical criterion of assuring retrievability of wastes.
Finally, salt appears to be unacceptable on the basis of
overall performance of the engineered system. Because of the
human intrusion problem, the corrosive nature of brine and its
migration, the ability of salt to provide for total containment for
1000 years and an annual release rate of one part in 1,000,000 of
the total activity thereafter is highly doubtful. Although salt has
been shown to be an unsuitable medium, an acceptable medium

has not been identified. Further, the research and development
program developed for salt is now found to be unsuited for the
investigation of other host rocks.
The DOE is beginning to study basalt, granite, shale, and
tuff as possible host media for a repository. In no case, however,
has DOE identified a host unit of adequate volume and appropriate depth that also meets NRC draft technical criteria.
1. Basalt.-The Basalt Waste Isolation Project (BWI[P) is
evaluating DOE's Hanford site in southeastern Washington
State to determine whether it contains a suitable location for a
repository in basalt. It appears that the Hanford site was selected for basalt investigation in large part because it is a DOE
site, and the agency, therefore, could avoid the political and institutional problems associated with siting a facility off the reservation. The site was not chosen on the basis of its favorable
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geological characteristics. The basalt at Hanford very likely will
be excluded as a potential host rock for radioactive waste repository because of the proximity of acquifiers and the potential for
radionuclide transport to the biosphere.40
2. Granite and Shale.-The Nevada Nuclear Waste Storage
Investigations are evaluating the suitability of DOE's Nevada
Test Site (NTS) for waste isolation."1 As with Hanford, the NTS
site was selected because it was a DOE site and its use would
avoid the political and institutional problems associated with
siting a facility on state or private lands. The site certainly was
not chosen on the basis of its preferred geology. The geology of
NTS is complex, a characteristic shared by all of the Basin and
Range Province in which the NTS is located. The siting requirements of the NRC's draft criteria call for the selection of "relatively geologically simple sites" in order to compensate for geologic and hydrologic uncertainties.4 2 If this criterion is to have
any meaning, the NTS is excluded as a location for a repository.
3. Other Media and Sites.-There is little in the DOE program to justify the belief that radioactive waste can be disposed
of safely in any other geologic media. While DOE's site exploration program is being expanded to a wider variety of rock types
in diverse geologic environments, the program is in its infancy.
C. DOE Has Not Conducted Sufficient In Situ Testing
The interaction of the waste form and the host rock is a key
factor in the safety of geologic disposal. For this reason, the
NRC's draft technical performance criteria require in situ testing to evaluate the interactions of waste form with the host
rock.43 The DOE has not conducted these tests on any of the
potential rock structures, although recent studies show that vitrified high-level radioactive wastes are not as stable in the geologic repository environment as previously believed."

40. Opinion of Drs. Thomas Cochran, Terry A. Lash, Arthur Tamplin, and Ms.
Georgia Yuan, technical experts at the Natural Resources Defense Council.
41. DOE STATEMENT OF POSMON, supra note 29, at 11-118. Of the rock types that
occur at NTS, argillite, granite, alluvium, and tuff have been considered for suitability as
host rocks.
42. DRAFT TECHNICAL CRrrER A, supra note 26, at 5.
43. 45 Fed. Reg. 31,401 (1980).
44. See F. Conath, supra note 37.
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D. DOE Has Not Developed the Technology for Successful
Borehole and Shaft Sealing
If not properly sealed, the boreholes and shafts used to define the structure of the rock at a repository site and in construction of a facility may provide conduits for the release of
radioactivity during all phases of repository operation. Recognizing this, the NRC requires "[t]he sealed shafts and boreholes to
provide a barrier to radionuclide migration which is at45least
equivalent to the barrier provided the undisturbed rock.
Past applications of sealing technology to oil and gas wells
and exploration boreholes largely have been concerned with
safety on the surface and not with ensuring that the entire
length of the shaft or borehole remains dry and competent for
thousands of years. Although this experience may provide a
starting point for the development of sealing materials appropriate for repository application, the materials have not been systematically tested over long periods.4" Additionally, sealing
materials never have been tested systematically for their reand pressure conditions that
sponse to the varying temperatures
47
can be expected in a repository.

Predicting the long-term integrity of sealing materials will
require gathering data on the chemical interactions between the
seal and the shaft linings and the surrounding rock mass. These
interactions must be studied under a variety of conditions with
respect to contact with water, in situ as well as in the laboratory. Emplacement techniques for seals must be developed with
particular attention to sealing zones with fractured or disturbed
rocks.
Although these matters are being addressed to some degree
by DOE, its research largely is limited to borehole and shaft
sealing in salt, and to a lesser extent, in basalt.48 Research on
45. 45 Fed. Reg. 31,393 (1980).
46. CALIORNIA ENERGY RESOURCES CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION,

FUEL REPROCESSING, SPENT
DISPOSAL 166 (Draft Report Jan. 11, 1978).
47. Id.
STATUS OF NUCLEAR

FUEL STORAGE AND HIGH-LEVEL WASTE

48. OFFICE OF NUCLEAR WASTE ISOLATION, THE STATUS OF BOREHOLE PLUGGING AND
SHAFT SEALING FOR GEOLOGIC ISOLATION OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE, (Report No. ONWI-15,
Battelle Memorial Institute, Columbus, Ohio, Jan., 1979); OFFICE OF NUCLEAR WASTE
MANAGEMENT AND U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, EARTH SCIENCES TECHNICAL PLAN FOR DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE IN A MINED REPOSITORY, (DOE/TIC-11033 Draft, Apr., 1980).
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borehole sealing of granite and shale lags so far behind that a
study of research needs for these two rock types concluded:
"[T]he art of borehole, shaft and tunnel sealing for long-term
confinement of nuclear waste is still in its infancy and.., a
comprehensive testing program will be required before the effectiveness of such seals can be known. '"'4 Furthermore, DOE has
yet to consider the problem of locating all the boreholes in the
vicinity of repository sites. Boreholes used for exploration and
geophysical studies prior to repository construction may be present at a site in large numbers.
E. The DOE Program Does Not Adequately Identify and
Resolve the Problems Inherent in Short- and Long-Term
Repository Monitoring
Two aspects of repository monitoring that must be considered in assessing the DOE program of waste disposal are: (1)
health physics monitoring for occupational and population exposure during the operational phase, and (2) monitoring for data
collection to determine whether the repository is capable of
meeting predetermined performance criteria.
Experience with the day-to-day health physics monitoring
of radioactive waste management facilities operated by DOE offers little confidence that this aspect of radioactive waste disposal will be conducted adequately for the long term. Monitoring
programs often have failed to collect the data necessary to predict accurately the presence or extent of a problem. They have
not included periodic review of procedures. Nor have they provided plans for follow-up actions once a problem has been
detected. 0
An example of these deficiencies is the program designed to
monitor the high-level radioactive waste storage tanks at the
Hanford Reservation.51 The Hanford program, which collects
data on ninety tanks containing radioactive waste, categorizes

49. LAWRENCE BERKELEY LABORATORY, GEOTECHNICAL AssEsSMENT AND INSTRUMENTATION NEEDS FOR NUCLEAR WASTE ISOLATION IN CRYSTALLINE AND AGRILLACEOUS ROCKS

133 (Symposium Proceedings, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Berkeley, Calif., July 16-

20, 1978).
50. See note 25 supra.
51. Report on Alleged Coverups of Leads of Radioactive Materials at Hanford, DOE
Office of Inspector General (Jan. 22, 1980).
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the tanks according to whether leakage is occurring. A recent report by the Inspector General of DOE concluded that the type
of measurements being made was not useful for determining the
extent of tank leaks.5 Furthermore, there was no provision in
the program for periodic review of the monitoring procedures. If
reports of tank leakage had not been made by an employee of
the contractor, it is questionable whether a review would have
ever taken place.
The experience with monitoring thus far indicates that,
even for the short term, there is little basis for believing that
such systems will function as designed. The DOE has not
demonstrated that it can monitor adequately existing waste
storage facilities, to say'nothing of a long-term repository holding several times the waste it presently oversees. Neither the nature of the monitoring needed for a waste disposal method nor
the period of time for which monitoring will be required has
been determined.
F. The DOE ProgramPlaces Undue Reliance on Risk
Assessment to Determine Repository Performance
The DOE waste disposal program relies heavily on risk assessment modeling to evaluate the performance of proposed geological repositories. Changes in the geological environment and
the uncertainties associated with the infancy of repository technology, however, make predictions about long-term performance
unreliable.

Furthermore, design and utilization of risk assessment models depend, at a minimum, upon the following: (1) an understanding of the processes that will influence the migration of nuclides in the event of failure of the repository; (2) empirical and
experimental data characterizing the environment, the waste,
and the interaction of the two; (3) estimates of the probability of
occurrence of natural geologic events and engineering failure;
and (4) characterization of potential future scenarios.5
The deficiencies in available data and current knowledge
about all of the factors concerned with nuclear waste storage
prevent the preparation of a model that can represent accurately
52. Id.
53. See note 25 supra.
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the risks of long-term storage. Even the best models cannot
make up for an incomplete understanding of the system being
modeled. For this reason, the NRC has limited specifically the
extent to which modeling results can be relied upon. 54
Although the technical problems that DOE faces are substantial, they pale in comparison to the social and political obstacles facing its waste disposal program. The DOE ignores
whole sets of important social, economic, and political factors,
and it does not include any clearly defined organizational plan
for implementation of a waste disposal system.

IV. THE DOE HAS NOT

IDENTIFIED OR ADDRESSED THE SOCIAL,

POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC ISSUES INVOLVED IN IMPLEMENTATION
OF A PUBLICLY ACCEPTABLE WASTE DISPOSAL PROGRAM

The management and disposal of radioactive waste is not
simply a technical problem. Technologies are not self-implementing. The success of any waste, management program depends as much upon its social, organizational, and institutional
features as on its designs and engineering. An NRC task force
concluded in 1978 that the "past failures of proposed radioactive
waste management systems have stemmed in large part from
neglect of nontechnological necessities in [the] implementation
... of systems." 55 In 1979, the Interagency Review Group on
Nuclear Waste Management reported to the President that "the
resolution of institutional issues ... is equally as important as
the resolution of outstanding technical issues and problems" and
that such resolution "may well be more difficult than finding solutions to remaining technical problems.""8
Despite these warnings, neither the NRC nor the DOE has
come to grips with the significance of these issues. The DOE has
only just recognized that these issues exist. It recently requested
the National Research Council to "attempt to identify social and
economic issues to be considered in selection of repository sites"
in order to "recommend ways in which to take various social and

54. DRAFT TECHNICAL

CRITERIA,

supra note 26, at 5.

55. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, ESSAYS ON IssuEs RELEVANT TO THE REGULATiON oF RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT 57 NUREG-0412 (W.Bishop, N. Hilberry, I.

Hoos, D. Metlay, and R. Watson (eds.) 1978).
56. NTIS REPORT, supra note 16, at 87.
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economic impacts into account in site selection ....
As a result, DOE has failed to confront and resolve the social, political, and institutional problems inherent in implementation of a waste disposal program. The Institute of Governmental Studies at the University of California at Berkeley cautions
that failure to consider social and political issues as an integral
part of the planning process for waste disposal is to "run the
risk of serious political opposition," which may doom an otherwise acceptable program.58
To be successful, the DOE program must meet dual objectives. It must be a program that the public sees as legitimate
and in which it has confidence, as well as one that provides reliable and safe waste disposal operations. If the first objective cannot be met, the nation may be unwilling to commit the necessary
political, technical, and economic resources to carry out the cho-

sen method, and thus the method will fail.
Achievement of the first objective requires the identification
and assessment of the relevant social and institutional obstacles
to implementation of the major phases of the waste disposal program: the initial phase of siting, construction, and licensing of
the first waste repository; the second phase of program expansion to cope with the increased volume of wastes produced by
the current and near future generation of light water reactors;
and the third, long-term management phase in which the technological and institutional arrangements previously created will
be tested over long periods of time. In each of these phases, new
issues will present themselves for resolution, and social, political,
and organizational arrangements appropriate to an earlier phase
may require modification.
A.

Phase One-Start Up

The phase of greatest concern at present is the initial startup of the waste disposal program. The DOE is compelled by the
decision in Minnesota v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 9 to

57. NATION AcAEMY OF SCmNcES, 30 NEws REPORT.
58. Rochlin, Demchak, Hershberger, Hoberg, Jr., LaPorte & Windham, SocIAL

AND
INSTTUIONAL ASPECTS OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE MAN4AGEMENM SOME PRELIMINARY FINDINGS, S.3 (195/RW001, Oct., 1979) [hereinafter cited as SocILL AN INsTrrTIoNAL
ASPECTS].

59. 602 F.2d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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develop a waste disposal program that can be implemented successfully before the expiration of the licenses of currently operating nuclear plants. Failure to do so threatens the continued
viability of the domestic nuclear program, the substantial investment made by utilities and the industry, and, to a significant
extent, public confidence in the ability of government to act decisively on a major social issue. The historical development of
nuclear power in the United States has linked inextricably the
federal government to the nuclear industry. Thus, the implementation of a waste disposal system is seen both by the public
and the industry as a governmental responsibility.
The initial phase presents the greatest number of social and
political uncertainties. Many of these have been identified and
discussed in the 1977 Report on the Task Force for Review of
Nuclear Waste Management (referred to as the Deutch Report) 0 and in the work of G.I. Rochlin and R. Kasperson, among
others. 61 Key social and political obstacles are discussed below.
1. Public Opposition and Lack of Trust.-Foremost among
the obstacles to implementation of the DOE program is the serious level of public opposition to nuclear power in general and
waste disposal locations in particular.2 This opposition is coupled with an increasing lack of trust in the ability of institutions
and persons charged with protecting the public from the hazards
of radiation to carry out adequately that responsibility.
The unwillingness of the public to accept a waste management program manifests itself in the efforts by towns, counties,
and states to restrict federal authority to transport and store
wastes within their political boundaries. By October 1980, seven
states had enacted laws banning nuclear waste importation for
terminal disposal and twenty-five others had passed laws restricting nuclear waste disposal. Thirty-one states have limited
or banned the transport of nuclear wastes within their boundaries. Indeed, by August 1980, only eight states had no laws relat-

60. Office of Energy Research, (DOE/ER-004/D, UC-70, Feb., 1978).
61. See, e.g., Testimony of Roger Kasperson, Institutional and Social Uncertainties
in Radioactive Waste Management, presented to the Ohio Power Siting Commission
(June 27, 1978).
62. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE GENERAL AcCOUNTING OFFICE, NUCLEAR ENERGY'S DILMMA: DISPOSING OF HAZARDOUS RADIOACTE
WASTE SAFELY (Sept. 1977).
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ing to the control of radioactive waste. 683

Former President Carter, in his statement of February 12,
1980, outlined a "consultation and concurrence" process as a
means of resolving differences between the states and the federal
government over the siting of waste disposal facilities." Implicit
in this policy is the idea that the sharing of information will lead
to agreement on siting questions. However, there is doubt that
simple information sharing will eliminate or even reduce the increasing reluctance of the states to be chosen as waste dumping
grounds. The states are not willing allies of the DOE and other
federal waste management agencies. They are unlikely to side
voluntarily with the federal government on waste disposal issues.
The consultation and concurrence concept was included in
the nuclear waste legislation which passed the Senate on July
30, 1980.15 The bill provided for federal consultation with state

governments concerning decisions to site waste repositories and
spent fuel storage facilities. States were also given an opportunity to oppose a DOE decision to site a facility within their
boundaries. The bill, however, set up three different procedures
for federal override of state objections. If a state rejected the
siting of a spent fuel storage facility, the bill provided for an
override by a presidential directive that the facility was in the
national interest. If a state objected to the location of a waste
repository, the project would proceed unless the state was able
to convince one house of Congress that its objections were justified. Finally, state objections to the disposal of military waste
could be overridden by a declaration from the President that
disposal was necessary for national security.
The states are .likely to regard such consultation as inadequate participation in waste disposal decisions. Their continued
opposition to siting threatens to frustrate the federal ability to
implement a program, regardless of which disposal method is

63.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION,

OFFICE OF STATE PROGRAMS,

INFORMATION

REPORT ON STATE LEGISLATION (1978-79); BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY DIVISION
OF REGIONAL STUDIES, SUMMARY OF NUCLEAR WASTE LEGISLATION (Unpublished draft

document) (Nov., 1980).
64. President's Message to Congress, Comprehensive Radioactive Waste Management Program, reprinted in [1980] U.S.

CODE CONG.

& AD. NEws 541, 541-45.

65. S.2189, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). The House passed similar legislation, H.R.
8378, but differences between the Senate and House versions were not resolved before
Congress adjourned.
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chosen; yet this matter has not been addressed by DOE.
2. Questions of Equity.-Closely tied to the problems of
public acceptance are questions of equity. Because the benefits
and risks of nuclear power are not shared equally around the
nation, some members of the public will be asked to bear the
risk of waste disposal for others. The degree of opposition at the
local level indicates how the public feels about this burden.
The success of the waste disposal program will depend upon
the development of siting principles that reflect both a systematic analysis of various social, political, and economic environments, and a determination of fairness and justice in allocation
of the risk.06 No such systematic analysis has been conducted by
DOE. Considerations of fairness and justice must be applied
both spacially and temporally. The latter relates primarily to the
intergenerational transfer of the risks associated with waste disposal, the former to the "not in my backyard" syndrome. A comprehensive approach to considerations of justice must also address the issue of compensation of persons who live near a waste
repository.
The DOE has failed to consider any of these issues in a direct or comprehensive way. Its views must be inferred from its

66. SOCIAL AND INSTITTIMONAL ASPECTs, supra note 58. The editors include in their
study a table, which lists the kinds of information that should be collected about the
social, economic, and political characteristics of representative or potential repository
sites. Some examples include:
- sociological data-urban/rural mix;
- professional/non-professional mix;
- racial and ethnographic data;
- age, sex and family data.
- political profile:
- attitude towards nuclear power generally;,
- sensitivity to local, extended and global environmental issues;
- attitudes towards remote, centralized authority (state and/or federal);
- historical local independence and self-sufficiency.
- social profile:
- activities;

- mobility;
- degree of social stratification;
- lifestyle preferences;
- median education level;
- typical wages/salaries;
- seasonal and migratory labor patterns, if any.
Id. Table 3.B.3, at 3.32. Data of this sort have not been collected by DOE.
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adopting, as one of its program's objectives, President Carter's
requirement that "[t]he responsibility for resolving military and
civilian waste management problems shall not be deferred to future generations," 67 and its meager discussion of "Social Concerns" in the Statement of Position submitted in the NRC's
"Waste Confidence" Proceedings. This discussion alleges that

"there is growing public recognition that nuclear waste management is a national problem and that solutions to the problem
should not be postponed for future generations." 68
3. Conflicts in Regulatory Policy.-The history of the waste
disposal program in the United States is a story of fits and starts
and major changes of direction and focus. The DOE and its
predecessors have seized upon a single waste disposal solution,
only to be forced to begin almost anew when the solution proved
not to be feasible. It is likely that developments nationally, particularly in Congress, will result in further redirections of the
program.
Although DOE has chosen geologic waste disposal, Congress
has not made a similar commitment to this option. The Senate
bill which passed on July 30, 1980,61 provided for long-term
away from reactor (AFR) storage and retrievable surface storage
of high-level wastes. The bill also provided for the rapid development of unlicensed "demonstration" waste repositories on
federally owned sites. All of these provisions would divert resources and efforts away from the development and implementation of a safe geologic disposal system.
Because the House was unable to pass its waste disposal legislation7 0 before adjourning, differences between the House and
Senate bills were never resolved. The House bill did not provide
for retrievable surface storage of wastes or for an AFR program.
It did require waste repositories to be licensed and subject to
full review in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act.
Other congressional efforts threaten to undercut the DOE
program. For example, the Energy and Water Development Ap-

67.
68.
69.
70.

DOE STATEMENT OF POSMON, § H-A.1.3., at H-18.
Id. § Im.F.2.2.2., at HI-87.
S.2189, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
H.R. 8378, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
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propriations Act,71 which passed the House on October 1, 1980,

provided only $199,477,000 of the requested $245,337,000 for
commercial waste management. The bill provided only
$175,551,000 of the requested $219,651,000 for commercial nuclear waste management operating expenses. Cuts were made in
terminal isolation research and development, waste treatment
technology, and support programs.
These cuts are indicative of the House Energy and Water
Subcommittee's views about the DOE waste disposal program.
The Committee Report stated that there should be a "major redirection of effort" in the program including: (1) increased emphasis on the construction of "demonstration" long-term storage
facilities for nuclear wastes, (2) increased emphasis on using existing federally owned sites that have already been subject to radiation effects for long-term storage or disposal; and (3) reduced
emphasis on "costly and unnecessarily 72
extensive multiple site investigation and geological evaluation.

Overall, the Committee bill provided a slightly more than
one-half of the requested $20,513,000 for spent fuel, storage-energy supply research and development. The Committee called
for an $8,000,000 reduction from the President's $19,513,000
proposal.
The Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act
also provided appropriations for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The Committee recommended $34,000,000 for the Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards, whose functions include the agency's nuclear waste management
responsibilities. This appropriation was substantially less than
the budget estimate of $43,680,000. The Committee Report explained the reduction as follows: "Until the question of commercial reprocessing is settled, the issue of commercial waste management cannot be settled."73
The Science and Technology Committee reported versions
of Title I and Title VII of the DOE Authorization Act, which

seriously undermine the' DOE geologic disposal program.7 ' The

71. Pub. L. No. 96-367, 97 Stat. 1331 (1980).
72. HoUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMM., ENERGY AND
Sess., REPORT 81 (Comm. Print 1980).
73. Id. at 148.
74. H.R. 6627, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
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Committee's amendments provided for the reprocessing of commercial spent fuel and storage of reprocessed wastes. Accordingly, the Committee eliminated critical funding for geologic disposal activities and instead provided funding for development,
virtually irrespective of geologic conditions. Moreover, the Committee's approach to geologic storage called for four demonstration repositories, the first to be in operation by 1986. Contrary
to the recommendations of the Interagency Review Group, these
repositories would not be licensed by the NRC and the opportunities for state and local participation in siting decisions would
be limited.
The development and implementation of a safe geologic
waste disposal program requires a commitment from Congress as
well as the executive branch. Both must share a view of what is
required to solve the waste disposal problem, and Congress must
provide adequate funds to complete the task. At present, it appears that DOE and Congress are at cross purposes.
4. Managerial and Regulatory Uncertainties.-In Roger
Kasperson's view, "management and regulatory issues constitute
perhaps the most formidable obstacles to a timely resolution of
the radioactive waste problem. ' 7 5 Of particular concern is the
absence of a mechanism for the coordination of all the departments within the federal government that have responsibility for
nuclear waste. 8
Ten different institutions share responsibility for radioactive waste matters, 77 three of which were created in 1980.78 Each

75. Testimony of Roger Kasperson, supra note 61, at 20.
76. The DOE Statement of Position stated that arrangements are being made for
interagency cooperation among a few of the organizations concerned with waste management. § m.D.2., at HI-42. These are far from complete, however. The necessary memoranda of understanding have not been prepared, nor have the substantive procedures
required for collaboration and implementation of the program been developed. Id.
III.D.2.1.1., at 11-42. Furthermore, the existence of cooperative arrangements does not
supplant the need for a means of over-all coordination of the waste management effort.
As "lead agency" for the development of a waste disposal method, DOE should function
in this capacity. It is apparent from its statement of position that it does not.
77. These institutions are the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department of
Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Transportation, the
U.S. Geological Survey, the Council on Environmental Quality, the Office of Science and
Technology Policy, the Federal Radiation Policy Council, the Nuclear Safety Oversight
Committee, and the State Planning Council.
78. The Federal Radiation Policy Council is responsible for the development of federal radiation protection policy. It will review actions of the NRC which affect public and
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of these organizations has its own mandate and agenda and its
own views on the appropriate shape and course of the waste disposal program. There is no consensus that the program will produce a safe method of disposing of wastes within a reasonable
time period. The U.S. Geological Survey, for example, has expressed doubts about the adequacy of the technical information
supporting the program and the validity of the geological assumptions used.7 9 The Office of Science and Technology Policy
has stated its opinion that "the knowledge and technology base
available today is not sufficient to permit complete confidence in
the safety of any particular repository design or the suitability of
any particular site."80
A significant reason for the lack of confidence by other federal agencies in DOE's program is that DOE still has not determined what must be done to design and implement a waste disposal program. The DOE is presently trying "to define the
technical efforts required for successful mined geologic waste
disposal ....
[These include] site identification and characterization, rock mechanics, repository sealing, waste/media interactions and repository performance assessment,"81 matters which
should have been the subject of research efforts at the beginning
of the waste disposal program. It is astonishing to find DOE attempting to "define the technical efforts required" for achievement of a goal that is more than twenty years old.
Because DOE does not have a clear idea of what is required
for implementation of the program, it cannot integrate the work
of other agencies into its own or direct their efforts in a meaningful way. No priorities have been established for the various
agency programs based on an overall schedule. Nor are the individual agencies fully aware of the efforts and schedules of other
organizations.

occupational health. The Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee is charged with overseeing

industry and government programs for improving reactor safety. The State Planning
Council is responsible for coordination of waste policy between the federal and state and
local governments.
79. Carter, Nuclear Wastes: The Science of Geologic Disposal Seen as Weak, 200
ScIENcE 1135 (1978).
80. T. BEDEHOEFT, A. ENGLAND, D. STEWART, N. TRASK, & . WINOGRAD, GEOLOGICAL
DISPOSAL OF HIGH-LEvEL RADIOACTIVE WASTEs-EARTH SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES, U.S. GEO-

LOGICAL SURVEY CmCuLAR 779 (1978).
81. DOE STATEMENT OF POSmON § m.D.2.1.1.1., at 111-44.
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A potentially more serious problem is the lack of consistency in the programs and schedules of various agencies. For example, DOE began searching for repository sites several years
before the NRC promulgated its site suitability criteria. As
noted earlier, the NRC's approach to siting is different from that
of DOE, which may result in selection of a site that is unacceptable to one or the other agency. This conflict may have occurred
already. The site chosen by DOE for the Waste Isolation Pilot
Plant (WIPP) has significant potash deposits, although the NRC
criteria would prohibit the location of a repository at a site with
such valuable mineral resources. 2
The DOE acknowledges that the NRC's procedural requirements for licensing a waste repository could have a "major impact on costs and schedule."83 In fact, these requirements could
mean the success or failure of the DOE program.
B. The Second Phase-Scaling Up
The entire focus of the present DOE program is on the location, construction, and operation of one repository, designed to
accommodate the nuclear waste DOE anticipates will be produced by the year 2000." The DOE has yet to address the technical and organizational problems of "scaling-up" from one facility to a disposal system capable of accommodating the wastes
from an expanding nuclear industry. The need to solve these
problems is far from theoretical. The roughly 200 GWe
(gigawatts electric) of nuclear power already on the books-that
is, in plants in operation, under construction, ordered, or publicly announced-will produce enough high-level radioactive
waste to fill two repositories, if the DOE capacity figure of
100,000 tons of waste per a 2,000 acre repository is used,8 5 or six

repositories, if the California Energy Commission figure of
35,000 tons per repository88 is relied upon. If a nuclear commitment of 300 GWe by the year 2000 is assumed,87 these numbers
82. See DERTMENT oF ENE GY, FEIS ON WIPP 9-17 to -27 (DOE/EIC-0026, Oct.,

1980).
83. DOE STATEMENT OF POSION at 111-73.
84. Id. at M1-22, 57-59, 77.

85. Opinion of Dr. Thomas Cochran, technical expert at the National Resources Defense Council.
86. Id.
87. The Electric Power Research Institute has argued that about 400 GWe by the
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increase to three and nine repositories respectively.
One fundamental problem with expansion of the waste disposal system is that it must be essentially error-free from the
outset. "[T]he incremental approach to perfect performance...
is explicitly not an option for the waste management program." 88 In other words, the public simply will not tolerate a
"learning curve" for waste disposal operations.
Second, the organization required to support an expanded
network of disposal sites will have different and more serious
problems than those confronting the location and operation of a
single repository. The organizational complexity of an expanded
waste disposal program is not linear with its size. As more waste
repositories are needed, the problems associated with site selection, facility, design, security, and transportation are multiplied,
wholly apart from the purely technical problems involved. Furthermore, as the waste disposal system expands, public confidence in its ability to perform without malfunction is likely to
decrease. In part, this is due to the application of that "bit of
organizational folklore, Murphy's Law":
The larger the volume of waste materials and the more varied
its composition, the larger and more complicated the total system is likely to be; and the more complicated the system, the
more we are prone to imagine that, if anything can go wrong,
invariably it will at some time or another.8"
As the accident at Three Mile Island demonstrated, the
least reliable factor in an elaborate scheme to control nuclear
dangers is the human factor. This factor will become increasingly crucial as the program expands. According to one
commentator,
[a]s the volume of wastes increases, the most crucial scarce resource may well become the people who are highly skilled and
who can be motivated sufficiently to perform continuously at
extraordinarily high levels of reliability, even though it is likely
that the jobs will generally be routine and boring on a day-to-

year 2000 reflects a minimun growth figure for the nuclear industry to survive. See EPRI,
Nuclear Waste Management Status and Recent Accomplishments, Final Report (NPD87, May, 1979).
88. SOCIAL AND INsTrrTmONAL ASPECTS, supra note 58, at 3.47.
89. LaPorte, Nuclear Waste: IncreasingScale and Socio-PoliticalImpacts, 201 SciENCE 26 (1978).
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day basis.90
Increased dependence on human reliability requires that the organization be equipped with an "error detection mechanism"
that will "reward detection and correction of error rather than
its denial or cover-up."9 1 Nothing in the DOE program is responsive to this problem.
Third, DOE has failed to analyze the impact of an expanded
waste disposal system on the social structure of the communities
directly affected by transportation and repository siting. The
DOE has assumed that "social concerns" about the safety of nuclear waste disposal will be resolved because of the "growing
public recognition that nuclear waste management is a national

problem.19 2 This attitude ignores a critical set of issues that
could lead to rejection of a waste management program. For example, DOE has not determined whether it will locate a series of
waste repositories at one site or region, or spread them out in
various locations across the nation. The social, economic, and
political implications of these two strategies differ, yet DOE has
not assessed them.
Finally, DOE has not prepared a detailed cost estimate of a
comprehensive waste management program. The need for organizational refinement and superior personnel necessarily will
lead to a high cost program-a cost which may be disproportionate to the "benefits" of nuclear power production. Moreover, the
cost to civil liberties that results from an authoritarian waste
disposal bureaucracy that decides which communities become
perpetual hazardous dumping grounds may be too great for society to bear.
C.

The Long-Term Management Phase

The final phase of the waste disposal program, which must
be assessed in terms of the social, economic, and political obstacles to its implementation, is the long-term management phase.
In this phase, the disposal technology and institutional arrangements will be tested over long periods of time.
It is impossible to make any predictions about the stability

90. Id. at 23.
91. SoCIAL AND INSTrrUTIONAL ASPECTS, supra note 58, at 3.47.
92. DOE STATEMENT OF PosMoN, at IH-87.
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of the social fabric or social and political institutions for the
length of time during which the nuclear wastes generated today
will remain hazardous. As a consequence, it may not be possible
to design any system other than an engineered one for the protection of future generations. This does not, however, excuse
consideration of the fundamental question of whether society
has a right to subject future generations who may share none of
the benefits of nuclear energy to the risks inherent in its waste.
The DOE's continuing failure to address seriously this issue is a
clear indication of its lack of understanding of the social and
political obstacles to the implementation of its program.
V.

CONCLUSION

The history of the federal government's efforts to find a solution to the problem of nuclear waste disposal provides no basis
for confidence on the part of the American public that nuclear
wastes will be managed safely in the future. It is a history of
"unbroken failure to produce an acceptable method of waste disposal,"9 3 a history of fits and starts and major changes in direction and focus from geologic disposal to retrievable surface storage and back again. Along the way the federal government has
adopted and then been forced to abandon disposal sites, media,
and technologies. The federal government has aroused the ire of
local politicans and the opposition of the public. It has failed to
understand that the problems are not only technical, but institutional and social as well. Finally, it has underestimated the complexity and difficulty of the task. The history of the government's waste disposal effort shows that little has been learned in
the past twenty years.
The DOE has not developed a plan that will meet even the
NRC's draft performance criteria for geologic repositories. In
numerous instances, DOE's program objectives are in conflict
with the NRC's criteria. Even when its objectives are not in conflict, there is no evidence that the NRC criteria will be met by
the DOE program.
There is no evidence that any of the specific alternative disposal schemes, media, and sites presently being pursued can and
will be used for safe waste disposal. Of the ten alternative dispo-

93. Address by G. Speth, supra note 19, at 7.
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sal methods allegedly under consideration by DOE, only geologic
disposal is a viable candidate. Others lag far behind in development or are so theoretical as to be beyond the realm of present
possibility.
With respect to geologic disposal, DOE's program has failed
to identify an acceptable site or host rock that meets the NRC's
technical criteria. The NRC criteria appear to rule out the use of
salt and basalt, and possibly granite, shale, and tuff as well. The
DOE's research and development program is not designed to
provide the comprehensive research effort required to resolve
the outstanding problems with its waste disposal plan. Basic research tasks have not been defined and implemented in a systematic manner. For example, in situ testing and the development of the technology for successful borehole and shaft sealing
lag far behind other, less important research efforts. The program does not address adequately the uncertainties asociated
with the selection of a suitable host rock nor will the plan lead
to the choice of an adequate waste form. Site work has been restricted mostly to federal reservations in order to avoid public
conflict.
Finally, DOE has not identified or addressed the social, political, and economic issues involved in the implementation of its
waste disposal program. Its emphasis continues to be on the
technical features of the waste disposal system, although the resolution of institutional issues is of equal importance. Indeed,
failure to properly resolve the social obstacles to implementation
may doom an otherwise acceptable program.
For these reasons, many segments of the American public
have substantial doubts about DOE's continued promises of a
prompt solution to this fundamental and long-standing problem
with the application of nuclear technology. Without doubt, the
disposal of nuclear waste is a problem that should have been
solved before the wastes were generated by the nation's nuclear
power plants. That DOE is still far from achieving a solution is
cause for dismay. It is also cause for continued opposition to the
licensing and operation of nuclear waste producing facilities.
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